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5 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: NIE-75, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953."

BACKGROUND

1. This estimate was requested by the NSC Senior Staff and the need for it reiterated by both the NSC Senior Staff and the IAC at the time SE-33, "Prospects for Survival of Mossadeq Regime in Iran," was approved by the IAC (8 October 1952).

SUBSTANCE

2. As far as we know, after two full days of meetings held with their representatives, the IAC agencies are in agreement on the content of the present draft.

3. However, after further discussion and consultation, the Board believes that the estimate does not sufficiently emphasize the difficulty of making any firm estimate about Iran for a period as long as a year ahead and the uncertainties surrounding two key elements in the Iranian situation:

- a. Whether the National Front will utilize efficiently, its capability to suppress mob violence and Tudeh agitation; and,
- b. The extent and consequences of possible Tudeh infiltration of the National Front.

4. The Board believes that the attached redraft of conclusion 1 (and corresponding material in paragraph 27 in text) will meet these points. (See TAB "A")

5. The commitment to have this paper before the IAC Senior Staff Thursday afternoon made it impossible to reconvene the IAC representatives to reconsider these points.

PAUL A. BOREL
Acting Assistant Director
National Estimates

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**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES**

5 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: NIE-75, "Probable Developments in Iran Through 1953"

Please make the following changes in the 4 November text of NIE-75 now before you:

Paragraph 6, page 2a, line 3 from top:

Put period after "opposition" and reword last sentence to read: "In his struggle to eliminate his opposition, and particularly if he failed to do so, Turkish influence and opportunities for gaining control would increase rapidly."

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Executive Secretary

Distribution "A"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES


5 November 1952

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: NIE-75: Probable Developments in Iran through 1953

1. Since the distribution to you of NIE-75, the Board of National Estimates, on further consideration, is recommending to the Director of Central Intelligence the adoption of the changes in TAB A (attached).

2. We regret we are unable to reconvene the IAC representatives to consider these points in advance of the IAC meeting because time does not permit. We are committed to get this estimate to the NSC Senior Staff Thursday afternoon (6 November).


Executive Secretary

Attachment: TAB A

Distribution A

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